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Abstract
The empirical validity of the locality (LOC) principle of relativity is used to argue in favour of a local hidden variable theory
(HVT) for individual quantum processes. It is shown that such a HVT may reproduce the statistical predictions of quantum
mechanics (QM), provided the reproducibility of initial hidden variable states is limited. This means that in a HVT limits
should be set to the validity of the notion of counterfactual definiteness (CFD). This is supported by the empirical evidence
that past, present, and future are basically distinct. Our argumentation is contrasted with a recent one by Stapp resulting in
the opposite conclusion, i.e. nonlocality or the existence of faster–than–light influences. We argue that Stapp’s argumentation
still depends in an implicit, but crucial, way on both the notions of hidden variables and of CFD. In addition, some implications
of our results for the debate between Bohr and Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen are discussed.
PACS numbers: 03.65.−W , 03.65.Bz.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Bell’s inequality (BI)[1] illustrates the fundamental
conflict between the quantum formalism and any formal-
ism, aimed at reproducing QM, in which the validity of all
classical principles is assumed in a quantum context (the
so–called “Hidden variable (HV) program” according to
Kochen and Specker [2]). In spite of the existence of
very reasonable arguments – both theoretical and empir-
ical – which retain the validity of the relativistic locality
principle,[3, 4, 5, 6, 7] and which remove any quantum
inconsistency or “paradox”, some people continue to pro-
pose arguments in favour of nonlocality (for a survey of
the recent literature, see e.g. Ref. 8).
One sequence of such nonlocality argumentations has
been set up by H.P. Stapp, starting in 1971[9] and so far
ending with his recent paper in Am. J. Phys.[10] While
his earlier argumentations were based explicitly on the
universal validity of CFD and on the assumption of the
existence of hidden variables (HVs), his later ones are
claimed to be no longer dependent on these assumptions.
Stapp concludes that the premises of QM entail “. . . some
sort of failure of the notion that no influence of any kind
can act over a spacelike interval.”
In his last nonlocality proof, Stapp[11] is concerned
to compare “. . . the possible consequences of making dif-
ferent choices. . . ” and admits that “. . . the argument in-
volves a certain weak form of counterfactual reasoning.”
It was precisely the use of CFD in this work that was
criticized by Mermin,[12] Unruh,[13] and Shimony and
Stein.[14] As on past occasions (see Refs. 15,16,17) Stapp
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could not be convinced, as these criticisms were followed
by several replies.[18, 19] In the Abstract of Ref. 10 it
is stated again: “The premises include neither the exis-
tence of hidden variables nor counterfactual definiteness,
nor any premise that effectively entails the general exis-
tence of unperformed local measurements”. In the same
paper Stapp admits once more that “The argument given
above rests heavily upon the use of counterfactuals: the
key statement SR involves, in a situation in which R2 is
performed and gives outcome ‘+,’ the idea ‘if, instead,
R1 had been performed...’”. In Ref. 11 Stapp complains
about the criticism that his nonlocality argumentations
still depend on counterfactual reasoning: “This fact is
sometimes taken as a sufficient reason to discard whole-
sale all EPR–Bell–type arguments. That tactic is not
rational.” Yet, in former work Stapp[20] stated that “No
satisfactory derivation of nonlocality, or the existence of
faster–than–light influences, can be based upon such a
CFD assumption: a failure of this assumption is (at least
in my opinion) far more likely than the existence of a
faster–than–light influence.” From Stapp’s persistence
to prove the nonlocality property of QM, it is apparent
that he has changed his opinion considerably, and tries
to remove the assumption of CFD from his nonlocality
proofs. Because also his recent proof needs CFD in some
(stronger or weaker) form, the previous criticism applies
also to that new proof.
In the present work our criticism of that kind of proofs
is also directed against the unjustified use of CFD. The
difference, however, with the work by Mermin, Unruh,
and Shimony and Stein, is that we are able to give a
plausible physical explanation for the possible invalidity
of CFD in the context of all nonlocality proofs. Our ap-
proach is based 1) on the argument that for entertaining
reasonable and rational argumentations in which single
quantum events are involved, one should first assume ex-
plicitly the existence of an appropriate quantitative for-
mal scheme describing such processes, and 2) on the fur-
ther obvious requirement that the theory may not violate
basic empirical data, such as Einstein locality as specified
in Sec. 2.
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In Ref. 10 Stapp then continues by arguing that his use
of CFD is justified (or at least is different from the use of
CFD by e.g. Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR), and
by Bell in a HV context) on the ground of his assumptions
“1. Free Choice”, “2. No Backward in Time Influence”,
“3. Validity of Predictions of quantum theory (QT): Cer-
tain predictions of quantum theory in a Hardy–type ex-
periment are valid.” However, we show in Sec. 6 that the
context in which his assumption “1. Free Choice” is used,
is equivalent with the assumption of HVs. Furthermore,
the passages in Stapp’s proof which deal with alternative
choices, definitely concern individual events, and are all
of the counterfactual type. In order to show the unjus-
tified use of CFD in these nonlocality–of–QM proofs, we
will specify in Sec. 5 in detail the conditions which justify
counterfactual considerations. This will allow us to show
in Sec. 6 the equivalence between the assumptions “Free
Choice” and HVs.
Although it is widely believed that it is the principle
LOC that should break down (i.e. Bell’s theorem), we
continue our past approach[3, 4, 15, 16, 17] and argue
that the origin of the conflict between QM and classical–
mechanics (CM)–like schemes is the assumed general va-
lidity of the idea of CFD, applied to the domain of indi-
vidual quantum processes. At first sight this conclusion
coincides with the critical remarks by Mermin and Un-
ruh (who warn to be careful with the use of CFD), and
with those by Shimony and Stein (in terms of “possi-
ble worlds”). There are, however, three main differences
with our procedure to get our conclusion:
1) we point to the fact that any nonlocality–of–QM
argumentation (including Stapp’s recent one) in-
termingles valid QM predictions with predictions
for alternative individual incompatible measure-
ment outcomes;
2) we remark that in so doing one leaves the domain of
validity and of applicability of QM (which is about
ensembles of similarly prepared systems), and con-
sistency demands the introduction of a quantitative
formalism for these individual quantum processes,
i.e. the existence of something like a HV formalism
is all the time implicitly presupposed. The alterna-
tive, followed in most nonlocality argumentations,
is to deny the need of HVs and to recourse in un-
reliable semantics;
3) we refer to former work by Houtappel, Van Dam,
and Wigner,[21] who stress the equal importance of
initial conditions within a particular theory. Join-
ing this view, we are able to give a plausible phys-
ical significance of a possible invalidity of CFD at
the individual quantum level of description. First,
it means that the breakdown of CFD concerns the
HVT, and not QM – in QM CFD is valid, see Sec.
5. Second, the HV states which represent the ini-
tial conditions within the HVT, do no longer have
the property of being reproducible in future prepa-
rations. In former work we called this the “nonre-
producibility hypothesis” (NRH);
4) our conclusion NRH points, possibly, to the origin
of the existence of incompatible observables in QM,
and, maybe, to the existence of the “arrow of time”
as a basic property of nature’s evolution.
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF LOCALITY
The requirement that “. . . no influence of any kind can
act over a spacelike interval” may be considered as a gen-
eral definition of locality. Its quantitative expression de-
pends on the theory which describes these influences or
physical processes. If this influence is understood as per-
taining to e.g. quantized fields, one gets the condition
that the field operators associated with spacelike sepa-
rated regions should commute (see Sec. 3.3). Ultimately,
these fields are used to make statements about measure-
ment outcomes. Because the assumed causal relationship
between the sets of past and future outcomes, is also the
result of the propagation of these physical influences, the
above locality principle applies equally to these observ-
able quantities. So, because these observations may be
considered as “events” in space–time, the locality princi-
ple as defined above, includes the locality principle of rel-
ativity. According to Einstein,[22] it means that “. . . the
real, factual situation of S1 does not depend on what
is done with S2 which is spatially separated from the
former”. This locality principle has been taken over by
Bell[1] (“. . . the result of a measurement on one system
be unaffected by operations on a distant system with
which it has interacted in the past. . . ”), and is the one
adopted in most other papers. Formulated in this way,
the locality principle concerns observable quantities, and
is called also “Einstein locality”. It is this definition of
LOC which will be adopted in the present paper. In QM
these observable quantities are represented by Hermitean
operators, and in a tentative HVT the representation is
e.g. by “result functions” A,A′, B,B′, i.e. the ones fig-
uring in Bell–type inequalities and in nonlocality–of–QM
argumentations.
III. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF LOCALITY
Successful and acceptable physical theories are built on
principles which correspond with well established basic
empirical data. In the case of QM, wave–particle duality
and Einstein locality, as defined in Sec. 2, belong to these
data. The first one corresponds with the superposition
principle, and the second one guarantees the indepen-
dence of the statistical QM predictions from actions or
choices in far–away regions, outside the observer’s light
cone.[23, 24] As a result, these principles constitute the
basis of all existing (quantum) theories, and no violation
of these principles have ever been observed.[52] There-
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fore, in our view it seems rational to accept (instead of
to criticize) the validity of LOC within QM and in any
other physical theory. It is our purpose to convince the
reader of the overwhelming evidence in support of LOC.
In addition to the empirical evidence, we summarize be-
low some further theoretical arguments in favour of the
validity of LOC.
A. Nonlocality Cannot Have General Validity
Consider one single individual correlated quantum pro-
cess. Observations confirm that the evolution between
the preparation and each of the correlated measurements
proceeds in a local way, in agreement with relativity. On
the one hand, according to the idea of quantum nonlo-
cality – or at least according to some of its interpreta-
tions –, the simultaneous correlated measurement pro-
cesses should influence each other in a nonlocal way. Un-
til now no one has been able to give a reasonable explana-
tion for this kind of dichotomy in the evolution of phys-
ical processes. However, this problem can be removed
immediately by accepting the general validity of locality,
and by considering the nonlocality argumentations as ev-
idence for other nonclassical properties of underlying HV
states, such as our NRH conclusion. This removes all
contradictions, and everything is now again supported
by empirical data.
B. QM is Formally Local
In general, QM makes deterministic predictions only
for the expectation values of observables. It follows that
in QM it is only via such deterministic statistical pre-
dictions that a nonlocal QM property may, eventually,
be observed. In this respect, it has been shown by Ghi-
rardi, Rimini and Weber[23, 24] and by others, that these
predictions are independent of far–away actions. Hence,
statements – or conclusions – about the nonlocal influenc-
ing of single measurement outcomes by other, far–away,
operations cannot be the result of argumentations held
within QM. Such argumentations require rather the in-
troduction of another formalism, in terms of theoretical
elements or notions not contained in QM.
C. Locality is a Basic Principle in all Elaborations
of QM
Locality is never empirically violated and, as a result,
it is built in explicitly in all successful physical theories,
such as in any formulation of relativistic quantum field
theory (QFT), string theory, etc. In these theories, field
operators Â(x) and B̂(y) in space–time points x, y satisfy
the commutation relation[28]
[Â(x), B̂(y)] = i∆(x− y) = 0 for (x− y)2 < 0 , (1)
known as “microscopic causality” or “local commutativ-
ity. In (1), ∆(x − y) is a singular function vanishing
outside the light cone. This basic relation represents the
universal validity of causality and locality. It means that
for spacelike separated intervals x − y, the observables
Â, B̂ commute and, hence, can be measured together in
such a way that the processes resulting in the measured
outcomes do not disturb each other, i.e. are indepen-
dent, in agreement with the principle LOC. Similarly, in
Weinberg’s classic book[29] the commutativity of space-
like separated observables ψl(x), ψl′ (y) is stated as:
[
ψl(x), ψl′ (y)
]
∓
=
[
ψl(x), ψ
†
l′ (y)
]
∓
= 0 (2)
with the justification “. . . The condition (2) is often de-
scribed as a causality condition, because if x−y is space–
like then no signal can reach y from x, so that a measure-
ment of ψl(x) at point x should not be able to interfere
with a measurement of ψl′ or ψ
†
l′ at point y.” For an
axiomatic approach, see e.g. Ref. 30.
From the success of these theories, it may be concluded
that there is no reason why the conflict between QM and
the BI should be interpreted as a breakdown of LOC in
QM. Recently, the validity of locality and causality in
QFT has been defended by Tommasini.[31]
D. Irrelevance of Nonlocality in the Conflict be-
tween QM and Classical–like Theories
The idea of quantum nonlocality results from a pro-
gram which tries to reconstruct QM (which makes deter-
ministic predictions for statistics) from a more detailed
theory of the classical type for the individual case. Ac-
cording to Kochen and Specker[2] this program investi-
gates “. . . the possibility of embedding quantum theory
into a classical theory . . . ”. However, this HV program
is ill defined because it violates basic QM rules from the
outset.[32, 33] Formally this is evident from Landau’s
identity:[34]
(
ÂB̂ + Â′B̂ + ÂB̂′ − Â′B̂′)2 = 41l + [Â, Â′][B̂, B̂′] (3)
where the observables Â, Â′, B̂, B̂′ represent correlated
measurements along 4 possible, but incompatible, experi-
mental settings: a, a′ in one region L and b, b′ in another
spacelike separated region R. From Eq. (3) it follows
that the expectation value of the left hand side satisfies
Cirel’son’s inequality:[35]
∣∣〈ÂB̂〉+ 〈Â′B̂〉+ 〈ÂB̂′〉− 〈Â′B̂′〉∣∣ ≤ 2√2 . (4)
It is worthwhile to remark here that Eq. (3), and hence
also Eq. (4), is a consequence of property (1), i.e. of the
assumed commutativity of spacelike separated QM ob-
servables, being an immediate formal expression of Ein-
stein locality. The fact that empirical data do not violate
Eq. (4), may be considered as convincing evidence that
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the principle of Einstein locality is firmly incorporated
in QM, at least if one restricts to its domain of validity
and of application, namely the ensemble of similarly pre-
pared individual cases. Leaving this domain easily leads
to wrong conclusions, such as the empirically not sup-
ported quantum nonlocality. In this respect one may ap-
ply van Kampen’s “theorem IV”,[36] according to which
“. . . whoever endows ψ with more meaning than is needed
for computing observable phenomena is responsible for
the consequences” – here, for explaining how the alleged
quantum nonlocality is compatible with the empirical va-
lidity of Einstein locality.
Now, in order to get a BI from Eq. (4), a further as-
sumption should be added, namely the validity of CFD
for single quantum processes. Restricting to quantitative
considerations, this brings us back to the HV program.
The assumed validity of CFD (either explicitly or implic-
itly) in any HV program, amounts in fact to a return to
the classical formalism in which all observables are com-
patible and all commutators vanish. Otherwise stated,
such a program violates QM already from the start, not
because of a violation of locality, but because of the as-
sumed unrestricted validity of CFD for single quantum
events. QM and locality are valid because the data sat-
isfy Cirel’son’s relation (4).
In such classical–like HV programs, inequality (4) re-
duces to the BI:
∣∣〈ÂB̂〉+ 〈Â′B̂〉+ 〈ÂB̂′〉− 〈Â′B̂′〉∣∣ ≤ 2, (5)
which is violated by QM predictions. It is seen that it is
the nonvanishing of local, single particle’s, commutators
[Â, Â′] and [B̂, B̂′], which is responsible for the violation
of BI by QM. This leads to the conclusion that it is the
noncommutativity of quantum observables pertaining to
a single system (which may be part of a larger one of
correlated systems) that plays a crucial role in the viola-
tion of the BI by QM. Hence, nonlocality cannot be held
responsible for that violation.
It is our opinion that this extended list of arguments
in favour of locality, is convincing enough to allow the
conclusion that the conflict between BI and QM may
only be explained by rejecting the other – mostly implicit
– basic assumption, namely the validity of CFD at the
subquantum level.
IV. HIDDEN VARIABLES AND SINGLE QUAN-
TUM PROCESSES
We argue in this section that all nonlocality argu-
mentations contain statements about individual quan-
tum processes, and that in general hidden variables are
needed for their quantitative description.
A. The Structure of Physical Theory
We assume that physical processes proceed in a lawful
way, and that the relevant basic laws have a mathemati-
cal expression. Our physical theories, then, are represen-
tations of these basic laws, and we shall consider them
as deterministic formal schemes, which allow an observer
to connect in a mathematical way causal relationships
between consecutive observations. The knowledge about
the first set of observations may be considered as ini-
tial conditions within the physical theory. The extension
of this formal scheme with statements about the signif-
icance of the theory’s concepts with respect to an even-
tually underlying reality, belongs to the interpretation of
the theory. In this work, however, we shall not go be-
yond the formalism itself, i.e. we take on a pragmatic
attitude. The main point is that the theory is considered
as a procedure to make predictions for future observa-
tions, given enough knowledge of previous ones. In this
approach notions such as “reality”, “realism”, “assigned
values”, etc. gain their significance only by their math-
ematical representation. E.g. “reality” is represented by
the theory’s state, “assigned value” by the prediction of
a measurement outcome, etc.
In any formal scheme a physical situation is repre-
sented by a state function, and the space–time evolu-
tion is determined by dynamical equations. Because the
theory concerns observations by macroscopic observers,
a procedure should be present for relating measurement
outcomes with the physical state. Another important no-
tion (yet frequently overlooked in foundational issues) is
that of the domain of applicability and of validity of the
theory. This is the domain for which the theory makes
verifiable, hence deterministic, predictions for measure-
ment outcomes in a successful way. As a consequence of
our pragmatic view, we will consider any statement in an
argumentation as a valid and a justified one, only if that
statement can be verified in an actual experiment. This is
an obvious (yet frequently overlooked) requirement, be-
cause otherwise there is no means to decide whether a
statement is false or true. This guiding rule will be used
in Sec. 5 to set up criteria for justifying counterfactual
statements.
Let us now look back at CM, QM and HVT from
the above pragmatic point of view. CM’s domain is
the description of single processes (giving rise to macro-
scopic observations) belonging to the macroscopic do-
main. QM’s domain, on the contrary, is the description
of the ensemble of single microscopic processes (again
giving rise to macroscopic outcomes). Only for such an
ensemble are the predictions determined in a determinis-
tic, hence verifiable, way. It follows that if considerations
are held for processes which fall outside a theory’s (e.g.
CM’s or QM’s) domain, then this implies the implicit
assumption that the reasoning presupposes another the-
ory which is appropriate for the situation considered. In
particular, this is the case with all nonlocality–of–QM ar-
gumentations, in which outcomes of single actual quan-
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tummechanical measurement processes are always com-
pared with other single, but incompatible, hypothetical
outcomes, i.e. outcomes which “would have occurred if
the alternative, incompatible, choice had been made”.
We conclude that in all nonlocality–of–QM argumen-
tations the availability of a HVT for single quantum pro-
cesses is presupposed. It is only under the further as-
sumption, that the HVT’s initial conditions may be re-
produced, that it is justified to compare predictions for
single outcomes. If it turns out, finally, that inconsis-
tencies arise, then one reasonable conclusion is that the
HVT’s initial conditions cannot be actualized, i.e. repro-
duced, again.
Our point is that in many of these argumentations the
need of HVs or a HVT is denied. Instead, the hypothesis
of HVs or a HVT is replaced by a semantical description
in terms of words only. In this way the assumption of
a HVT is hidden and made implicity. To remedy for
this inconsistency, the idea of a HVT must be introduced
explicitly.
Also in his recent work Stapp rejects a priori an anal-
ysis in terms of HVs, on the incorrect grounds 1) that
the HV assumption is “. . . logically equivalent to the as-
sumption that values can be pre–assigned conjunctively
and locally to all of the outcomes of all of the alternative
possible measurements.”, and 2) that it “. . . conflicts with
. . . the orthodox quantum philosophical attitude that one
should not make any assumption that effectively postu-
lates the existence of a well defined outcome of a local-
ized measurement process that is not performed.” Argu-
ment 1) is incorrect because from the end of the previous
paragraph and from Sec. 5 it follows that it can be in-
validated easily by setting limits to the reproducibility
of initial states in the HVT – which amounts to setting
limits to CFD. Argument 2) is incorrect because QM has
in general nothing at all to say about “the existence of a
well defined outcome of a localized measurement process
that is not performed”, i.e. in QM such an assumption
can neither be made nor be denied a priori on “orthodox
quantum pilosophical” grounds. Only when a new for-
malism, such as a HVT, is presumed does it have sense
to ponder about arguments 1) and 2).
Applying, then, the format of CM and QM to the hy-
pothetical HVT, a general state λ(x, t) should be intro-
duced as a representation of the individual physical sit-
uation (or, in EPR’s terminology, a time–dependent “el-
ement of reality”), in the same way as the QM state |Ψ〉
is a representation of the “reality corresponding with the
ensemble”. This individual situation may well be the
result of an observer having made a particular choice.
But different choices cannot be considered together, be-
cause only one of them may correspond to a measurement
process. Hence, different choices for individual processes
should be represented by different HV states.
As in CM and QM, dynamical laws determine in a
deterministic way the HV state at any other instant. Be-
cause the HVT is aimed to describe individual situations,
the HV state λ(x, t) may be considered as a more faithful
representation of nature – or reality – than the QM state
ψ(x, t). Finally, a link with observation by a conscious
observer is established by introducing result functions
R(λA(x, t)), which give the outcome r = R(λA(x, t))
when the observable A is measured.
B. The Role of Initial Conditions
Houtappel, Van Dam, and Wigner[21] stressed the
equal importance of the initial conditions and of the laws
of physics “. . . because the laws of nature do not lead to
observable consequences unless the initial conditions are
given . . . ”. These initial conditions concern the theory’s
state representing, in terms of EPR’s terminology, some
“element of physical reality”. In CM, the initial state is
determined by the prepared values of a number of observ-
ables (which all are compatible, the prepared value of one
observable not being influenced by the preparation of any
other one). In QM the initial state is determined by the
some repeated preparation procedure, and in a HVT the
prepared initial state is represented by λ(xµ), which is up
to now completely unspecified and, hence, very general.
Whereas in CM and in QM states may be reproduced,
the reproducibility of λ(xµ) (which would justify the use
of CFD in HVT, see Sec. 5) should have the character of
an extra assumption.
C. Determinism or Indeterminism?
Determinism is a formal property of any theory. It
is this property which allows the theory to make verifi-
able predictions. In the case of QM, the deterministic
predictions concern the statistics of outcomes within an
ensemble of measurement events. Because the statistics
obey deterministic laws, it seems plausible to assume that
also the individual quantum processes obey determinis-
tic laws. We consider this a reasonable approach (among
other reasonable ones).
One of the origins of the dissatisfaction with QM is pre-
cisely the discrepancy between the fact that QM in gen-
eral makes only statistical predictions in a deterministic
way, and the idea that the observed individual outcomes
should allegedly have no determinite cause in the past
(such as in Copenhagen–like interpretations of QM[37]).
In the words of Stapp:[38] “Some writers claim to be com-
fortable with the idea that there is in nature, at its most
basic level, an irreducible element of chance. I, however,
find unthinkable the idea that between two possibilities
there can be a choice having no basis whatsoever. Chance
is an idea useful for dealing with a world partly known
to us. But it has no rational place among the ultimate
constituents of nature.” Such words are reminiscent of
Einstein’s view that “God does not play dice”. However,
on account of Stapp’s recent attempts to prove the nonlo-
cality property of QM, this former view of him is clearly
opposite to his present one.
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An apparently overlooked – or forgotten – old inter-
ferometer thought experiment by Renninger,[39] may be
invoked as an indication for the existence for determin-
ism even at the ontological level. Indeed, in Renninger’s
thought experiment, it is possible to influence in a causal
way the realities corresponding with a single quantum
system moving in both arms of an interferometer, in such
a way that the final outcome is predictable with certainty,
no matter how many times – in principle an infinite num-
ber of times – one has influenced these realities moving
simultaneously in both arms.
The deterministic laws for the individual case, then,
constitute the HVT for individual quantum processes.
At present, however, the observer’s limited technical ca-
pabilities prevent control over the supplementary observ-
ables. Such a HVT should then bear the general prop-
erties of a physical theory, discussed in Sec. 4.1. This
means that also in a HVT, locality should still be a valid
principle, and that for given initial conditions (of which
one is not a priori sure that they are reproducible, as is
yet empirically the case in CM and QM) of the HVs, the
HVT should predict in a deterministic way the unique
outcome of the future event that will actually happen.
Some further remarks with respect to determinism
may be made here. Jammer[40] notes that “It has been
claimed that even the most “progressive” theoretician
believes at the bottom of his heart in a strictly deter-
ministic, objective world even if his teachings categor-
ically deny such a view . . . It explains, however, why
some physicists rejected the prevailing probabilistic in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics and tried to demon-
strate that the existing theory in spite of its spectac-
ular success is only a provisional approximation to a
deeper scientific truth.” With respect to the realizabil-
ity of EPR’s program (suggesting a more detailed, deter-
ministic, description of the individual quantum process)
Dirac’s opinion[41] is that “. . . we think it might turn out
that ultimately Einstein will prove to be right, because
the present form of quantum mechanics should not be
considered as the final form. There are great difficulties
. . . in connection with the present quantum mechanics. It
is the best that one can do till now. But, one should not
suppose that it will survive indefinitely into the future.
And we think it is quite likely that at some future time we
may get an improved quantum mechanics in which there
will be a return to determinism and which will, there-
fore, justify the Einstein point of view”. More recently,
in an interview on Dutch TV, S. Weinberg expressed a
similar opinion and claimed that maybe, finally, natu-
ral processes proceed in an entirely deterministic way.
It may be noted also that recently ’t Hooft[42] started
developing deterministic models for individual quantum
processes.
V. CRITERIA FOR A JUSTIFIED USE OF CFD
It is argued in the present work, that the reason for
the appearance of quantum contradictions is the unjus-
tified use of CFD in the domain of individual quantum
phenomena. Usually, the general validity of CFD is ac-
cepted either as a self–evident assumption, or by invoking
the authority of Bohr: “Bohr repeatedly emphasized the
freedom of experimenters to examine either aspect or an-
other of an individual quantum system” (Stapp in Ref.
11, p. 301), or: “. . . Bohr did not want to take the difficult
road of trying to ban all use of counterfactual concepts
in physics . . . he recognized that counterfactual concepts
do play an important role in the pragmatic approach to
physics that he was pursuing.” (Stapp in Ref. 10).
Also others refer to Bohr, e.g. Peres[43] states that
“Bohr did not contest the validity of counterfactual rea-
soning. He wrote: ‘our freedom of handling the mea-
suring instruments is characteristic of the very idea of
experiment . . . we have a completely free choice whether
we want to determine the one or the other of these quan-
tities. . . ’ . . . Just as EPR, Bohr found it perfectly legiti-
mate to consider counterfactual alternatives. He had no
doubt that the observer had free will and could arbitrar-
ily choose his experiments” (emphasis by A. Peres). We
remark here that there is no incompatibility between a
possible determinism on the HV level of description, and
our experience of free will. The reason is that the ob-
server’s limitations prevent him to know, or to become
aware, of his precise HV state λ(x, t).
Both Stapp and Peres argue that in everyday life and
in physics, CFD is an essential part of reasoning. In-
deed, it is on account of the validity of CFD in CM, that
scheduling a journey is an allowed reasoning, and in Ref.
11 Stapp considers the case where and electron “‘would
have landed’ if the experimenter had used in the experi-
ment a second apparatus, ‘instead of’ the first one”. The
point is that in both of these CM cases, CFD is used in
a justified way, because the initial conditions may be re-
produced, allowing the verification of the counterfactual
statement. According to Stapp this then “. . . illustrates
the fact that theoretical assumptions often allow one to
say with certainty, on the basis of the outcome of a cer-
tain experiment, what ‘would have happened’ if an alter-
native possible apparatus had been used.”
It is evident that similar examples may be given also in
the domain of applicability and of validity of QM. In QM
the state |Ψ〉 is reproducible and, when the expectation
value
〈
Â
〉
is actually measured, then it has sense to ask
the counterfactual question “What would have been the
expectation value
〈
B̂
〉
if another observable B were mea-
sured instead”. This counterfactual question has sense
because it can be investigated in a real, actual, experi-
ment described by the same quantum state |Ψ〉. By look-
ing why CFD is valid in the specific examples of CM and
of QM, we get the following three criteria for a justified
use of CFD in each particular situation.
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A. Criterion of Availability of a Theory (CT)
The above examples of CM and QM suggest that an
unproblematic use of CFD is connected with the avail-
ability of a working theory, and with theoretical possibil-
ities which are allowed not only by that theory, but also
by nature itself. If it turns out that some theoretical pos-
sibility is empirically not allowed, then such a possibility
cannot be considered counterfactually. For example, in
Newton’s theory negative mass is a theoretical possibility
which is not allowed by nature. According to this theo-
retical possibility, particles in a graviational field should
not fall down but move upwards, contrary to any obser-
vation. In general, superselection rules are added to the
theory “by hand”, in order to remove such cases or initial
conditions.
Now, as a rule quantum paradoxes generally arise
when QM predictions, dealing with ensembles of quan-
tum events (for which a detailed theory, QM, is avail-
able), are tried to be reconstructed by means of con-
siderations about the individual events of this ensemble
(for which as yet no detailed theory is available). How-
ever, consistency then demands that such considerations
be held within some theoretical framework, so that all
assumptions may be stated in an explicit and quantita-
tive way. We shall call this requirement the criterion CT,
i.e. for each particular case, a quantitative formal scheme
must always be presupposed.
B. Criterion of Verifiability (CV)
Physical theories should make verifiable predictions,
and this implies that they are formally deterministic.
This property determines the theory’s domain of appli-
cability, and as long as the predictions are correct, the
domain of applicability coincides with the domain of va-
lidity.
For instance, CM makes deterministic predictions for
individual events, and its domain of applicability is that
of the individual case. However, CM does not apply to
individual quantum processes, so that its domain of va-
lidity is rather restricted. Therefore, CM is not complete.
QM, on the other hand, in general makes determin-
istic predictions only for the statistics of measurement
outcomes within an ensemble of measurements following
a specific preparation. It follows that the domain of ap-
plicability and of validity of QM is that of ensembles. Of
course, these deterministic QM predictions for ensembles
of quantum systems, may be transformed into probabilis-
tic statements about individual measurement outcomes.
However, these probabilistic statements about individ-
ual cases do not satisfy CV. Therefore, the description
of the individual quantum process does not belong to
the domain of applicability of QM, but rather belongs to
its interpretation. On this ground neither QM may be
termed a complete theory, which was also the conclusion
of EPR’s argumentation.
Finally, applied to possible HVTs for individual quan-
tum processes, CV requires them to be also of the deter-
ministic type. In such HVTs, individual quantum prepa-
rations of both the object system and the measurement
system for a specific observable, should allow then to
make predictions with certainty for that observable.
C. Criterion of Actualizability (CA)
Given a theoretical scheme, physical relevance of coun-
terfactual reasoning requires furtheron that the condi-
tions which underly physical argumentations not only are
theoretically possible, but also that they may correspond
with actualizable physical situations.
In particular, counterfactual argumentations which
concern non–actual processes and events, have physical
relevance only insofar as one is guaranteed of the possi-
ble actualizability, at least once, of the non–actual pro-
cess. It should be clear that such a guarantee cannot
come from the allowance by the theory of a particular
situation as a theoretical possibility, but may come only
from actual experience. Such an actualizability or re-
producibility condition would justify not only the use of
CFD, but also the (further) assumption that counterfac-
tually considered processes obey the same rules as actual
processes.
In summary, counterfactual reasoning in some domain
is justified provided it is assumed that a formally de-
terministic theory for the relevant processes exists, and
that the physical situations it describes are actually re-
producible, in the sense that they are representable by
identical states within the theory. If this assumption does
not correspond with reality, then a number of situations
will be encountered for which paradoxical results may be
derived.
So, it may be envisaged that restricting the justified
use of CFD for single quantum processes, is one of the
possibilities to resolve inconsistencies ensuing from at-
tempts to reconstruct QM in terms of a classical frame-
work. The physical ground for a possible invalidity of
CFD at the individual quantum level is that CA is not
fulfilled, or that a reproducibility hypothesis (RH) con-
cerning a former actual situation is not valid.
A picture in terms of nonreproducible situations at the
subquantum level provides, then, an alternative physi-
cal explanation for the apparent “nonlocality” in various
correlated situations (of the EPR–Bell–type), and for the
phenomenon of contextuality in a number of other situ-
ations (of the KS–type). Moreover, this alternative is
supported by the empirical fact that past, present and
future are different. The validity of CFD at that level
would mean that nature allows history to be repeated.
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VI. COMPARISON WITH STAPP’S RECENT
NONLOCALITY ARGUMENTATION
A. Equivalence of Stapp’s Property “Free
Choices” with CFD and HVs
Comparing Stapp’s earlier proofs (e.g. Refs. 9, 44) with
his more recent ones (Refs. 10, 11) Stapp replaces his
former assumptions HV and CFD by a property called
“Free Choice”. He claims that CFD and HV entail “Free
Choice”, but that the converse is not true. We argue,
however, that in the context of his nonlocality argumen-
tation, “Free Choice” is equivalent with CFD and HV.
As mentioned in Sec. 5.1, Stapp tries to get a justi-
fication for the validity of CFD in individual cases by
referring to Bohr and he states: “This ‘Free Choice’ as-
sumption is important because it allows the causal part
of cause–and–effect relationships to be identified: the
choices made by experimenters to be considered to be
causes. This identification underlies all Bell–type ar-
guments about causal relationships”. Therefore, in his
argumentation “CFD” is now replaced by “Choice”. It
follows, however, from our discussion in Sec. 4.1 that by
reasoning on individual quantum events and processes
in terms of “choice”, the existence of the notions of HV
and of HVT is still implicitly assumed. Because only one
choice can be made at a time, each choice (made at one
particular instant) must be represented by its own a HV
state in the appropriate HVT. In nonlocality argumen-
tations, the individual case concerns an entangled situa-
tion, and HV states λL, λR represent the physical situa-
tion in two spacelike separated regions L and R. Stapp’s
idea to introduce choice (e.g. in region R) implicitly as-
sumes, then, that the HV state λL remains identically
the same at different times. But this is again a counter-
factual statement about an individual quantum process
which, as follows from our discussion in Sec. 5, is only jus-
tified under the condition that RH is valid. Hence, the
notions of “Choice” and “CFD”, or “RH”, are identical
when translated in the necessary HV formalism.
B. Stapp’s Recent Am. J. Phys. Argumentation
Stapp’s argumentations in Refs. 10, 11 are based on
the Hardy–state
|Ψ〉 = N(|c1〉 |c2〉 −A2 |u1〉 |u2〉) (6)
(Eq. (12) in Ref. 45) which is a correlated state for two
systems i = 1, 2, with {|ci〉 , |di〉}, {|ui〉 , |vi〉} different
sets of basis vectors, corresponding with incompatible
observables for both systems. N is a normalization con-
stant, and the choice of the constant A2 is such that
A2 = 〈u1u2|c1c2〉. Stapp denotes these incompatible ob-
servables by L1, L2 in the left region L, with possible out-
comes L1±, L2±, and by R1, R2 in the right region R,
with possible outcomes R1±, R2±. The correspondence
between both notations is given in Stapp’s Appendix A:
L1(+,−)→ (c1, d1) (7)
L2(+,−)→ (v1, u1) (8)
R1(+,−)→ (d2, c2) (9)
R2(+,−)→ (u2, v2). (10)
In this notation (6) becomes:
|Ψ〉 = N(|L1+, R1−〉−|L2−, R2+〉 〈L2−, R2 + |L1+, R1−〉)
(11)
and obeys the relations:
〈L2−, R2 + |Ψ〉 = 0 (12)
〈L1−, R2− |Ψ〉 = 0 (13)
〈L2+, R1 + |Ψ〉 = 0 (14)
〈L1−, R1 + |Ψ〉 6= 0. (15)
With (12), (13), (14) there correspond the following pre-
dictions with certainty:
L1− ⇒ R2+ (16)
R2+⇒ L2+ (17)
L2+⇒ R1−, (18)
while (15) corresponds with
L1−; R1− . (19)
As Mermin[12] remarks, the predictions corresponding
with (16),. . . ,(19) should be considered as facts which are
independent from the reference frame in which the exper-
iments are described. This, then, should justify Stapp to
set up the chain
L1− ⇒ R2+⇒ L2+⇒ R1−, (20)
which, however, contradicts (19), allowing Stapp to com-
plete his nonlocality argumentation. As mentioned in the
Introduction, Mermin’s criticism was that at some stage
of the complete proof in Ref. 11, CFD was used in an
unjustified way.
Now, for the state (11), Stapp considers in his new ar-
gumentation a Lorentz frame LF in which the observed
outcomes in L occur before those in R. He arrives then
at his nonlocality conclusion by proving two Properties
1 and 2. For the proof he uses the predictions with cer-
tainty (17) and (18). With the notation L2 meaning that
experiment L2 is performed in L, Property 1 reads:
“Property 1. Quantum theory predicts that if an exper-
iment of the Hardy–type is performed then, L2 implies
SR, where,
SR = If R2 is performed and gives outcome +, then if,
instead, R1 had been performed the outcome would
have been −.”
The proof of this property is based on the assumption
that “. . . the choice made in R does not affect the out-
come that has already occurred in L. . . ”. Here Stapp is
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definitely reasoning with single quantum events which in
general are not described by QM, i.e. one has gone out-
side QM’s domain of applicability. This means that the
predictions with certainty (17) and (18) are valid only
for two different actual ensembles, E1, E2, each of which
is described by the same Hardy–state (11). However,
using the same predictions with certainty for one single
ensemble, E1 or E2, has no sense within QM.
Indeed, from our discussion in Sec. 4, it follows that
a rational quantitative account of individual quantum
phenomena presupposes the availability of a HVT. The
only exceptions are those cases where QM makes predic-
tions with certainty, i.e. for each of the predictions (16),
(17), (18) separately in ensembles E1, E2, E3. However,
the point is that Stapp combines such predictions with
certainty for one single ensemble. Our argument is that
a description of such a situation presupposes a HVT in
terms of HV states. Furthermore, if one wants to set
up a nonlocality argumentation, our criteria CV and CA
require that within that theory it should be possible to
keep the cause for the occurrence of the earlier outcome
in region L constant. In HV terms this means that the
HV state λL in L (which gives rise to the occurrence of
the definite outcome rL in L (e.g. L1± or L2±)) should
be reproducible. Because R1 and R2 are incompatible,
the actual outcomes in R and L can only be obtained
in different experiments, occurring at different times tR1
and tR2. For these times, one should consider in the HVT
different HV states λL(tR1) and λL(tR2). Now, Stapp’s
assumption that a free choice in R which does not influ-
ence the past outcome rL in L, amounts to the condition
that the cause for the occurrence of the actual outcome,
namely the HV λL, can be kept constant and gives rise
to the result rL, i.e.:
λL(tR1) = λ −→ rL, λL(tR2) = λ −→ rL. (21)
Only this assumption allows Stapp to use his results (17),
(18) in tandem to get his Property 1.
It is seen that in our quantitative approach, the justi-
fication of Stapp’s counterfactual statements in his prop-
erty SR (which is in terms of observations in R), de-
pends crucially on the reproducibility of the HV state λL
as the cause in the region L where the actual outcome
rL ≡ L2+ of experiment L2 is obtained. Hence, it is not
the assumption that it is the choice in R that must be
considered as the cause for the constancy of L2+, but
rather the identity of the HV states λL(tR1), λL(tR2).
Only with the assumption of this identity of HV states,
i.e. their reproducibility, may Stapp’s argumentation be
carried on to the inconsistency with his Property 2, from
which his conclusion to the existence of “. . . some sort of
faster–than–light influence” follows.
As a consequence, if the assumption RH leads to the
nonlocality conclusion (which we reject on empirical and
theoretical grounds, see Sec. 3, the origin of contradictory
conclusions should be the invalidity of RH. Hence, with-
out the assumption RH, Stapp’s premise SR is physically
irrelevant. Our present criticism is general, and applies
equally well to all former nonlocality argumentations.
VII. LOCAL HV SCHEME UNDERLYING QT
QM answers successfully all relevant questions, and
covers present day technological capabilities. Hence,
there is as yet no empirical need for a more detailed
HVT, and no one has the slightest idea how to start such
a program. However, some theoretical arguments for yet
to consider the idea to base QM on a HVT are 1) the
dissatisfaction with the present statistical QM, 2) the at-
tempts to remove the alleged nonlocality property of QM,
and 3) the ontological existence of EPR–type “elements
of reality” which have no represention in QM.
A convincing proof of this existence is given by
Renninger,[39] by means of an interferometer thought
experiment. Using such a setup, Renninger showed un-
ambiguously that with each single quantum system mov-
ing through the interferometer there correspond realities
moving along both paths. In terms of the notions parti-
cle and wave, one path should contain the particle, and
the reality in the other path is usually called an “empty
wave” (EW). By incerting phase shifters (in fact, “half
wavelength” plates) he showed explicitly that these re-
alities, including the empty wave, are causally influen-
cable in each single case. In contrast with what Stapp
calls “orthodox quantum philosophy”, Renninger stated
that “Die Anschaulichkeit soll nicht vorzeitig aufgegeben
werden”, i.e. “The pictorial representation should not be
given up prematurely”. Of course, these cases are cov-
ered well by QM because the interventions in both paths
correspond with predictions with certainty and, hence,
apply to each individual case. Recently, Hardy[46] has
tried to prove the converse, namely that also the EW
is able to change the state of a quantum system. It
may be shown[47] that Hardy’s argumentation is based
on assumptions which lead to contradictory QM results.
However, notwithstanding the present lack of evidence
for EWs influencing themselves directly and observably
other systems, Renninger has shown unambiguously their
ontologic existence (see also Sec. 4.3).
Because all available empirical data are described very
well by QM, they cannot be used as a clear guide for in-
troducing a new quantitative scheme, as a substitute for
QM. Therefore, we are only able to give a very general
account of our resolution of the so–called “incompatible
quantum results”. In agreement with our starting points
above, we shall adhere to the view that for each single
observation there exists a causal reason on a deeper level
of description. We shall assume that, instead of chance,
it is our ignorance of the precise individual state, follow-
ing a preparation or a measurement, which is responsi-
ble for the uncertainty about future outcomes. As the
variables in QM allow only the deterministic prediction
of the statistics, we will need supplementary (“hidden”)
variables and a new (“hidden variable”) theory allowing
the prediction of individual outcomes for specific initial
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conditions. As remarked above, it is nature itself that
determines which initial conditions are realizable, and
whether they are reproducible or not in subsequent runs
of an experiment. Such a HVT for individual quantum
processes should conform the general requirements of a
theory, namely its principles should agree with empirical
data (such as locality), and the initial conditions should
allow to predict in a causal and deterministic way the
unique outcome of future events, but only one at a time.
Consider, then, two identically prepared ensembles
E1, E2, consisting each of N individual preparations,
and described by a quantummechanical state |Ψ〉. La-
beling each element in an ensemble by i, we may
represent E1, E2 also in terms of sets of HV states
by
{
λ(xµi;1), i = 1, . . . , N
}
, and
{
λ(xµi;2), i = 1, . . . , N
}
,
where dependence on space–time coordinates xµ is ex-
plicitly noted. In this way we may write the following
equivalences:
{
λ(xµi;1), i = 1, . . . , N
} ∼ |Ψ〉 , (22)
and
{
λ(xµi;2), i = 1, . . . , N
} ∼ |Ψ〉 . (23)
We now remark that the identity with respect to the
QM state vectors does not necessarily mean identity with
respect to the HV states and, hence, does not imply
λ(xµi;2) = λ(x
µ
i;1), i = 1, . . . , N , (24)
i.e. the sets of individual states
{
λ(xµi;1), i = 1, . . . , N
}
,
{
λ(xµi;2), i = 1, . . . , N
}
(25)
are not necessarily identical, even after any possible re-
organization of the elements of the sets. The possibility
that such nonidentical ensembles on the HV level, may
yet give rise to identical QM predictions for the statistics,
has been proven by Kupczynski.[48]
In the domain of application of CM and of QM, na-
ture allows the preparation of physical situations such
that their mathematical representation is by identical
functions, i.e. the corresponding physical states are re-
producible. However, it is not evident that nature allows
the same to be true for individual HV states, i.e. this re-
mains a supplementary assumption which may be invalid
at a HV level of description. In the above sections we
have argued in favour of the nonreproducibility of phys-
ical states at the HV level of description. As is the case
with Einstein locality, this nonreproducibility is in full
agreement with the empirical fact that past, present and
future are observably distinct. Hence, “nonreproducibil-
ity of individual HV states” may be a possible solution for
saving locality, and for removing all quantum paradoxes.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have started from the observation that all known
empirical data verify the principle of Einstein locality, as
defined in Sec. 2. We have argued that, rather than ques-
tioning that principle, it should be incorporated firmly in
our physical theories. This has been shown the case for
QM and its more recent elaborations.
Assuming the validity of this principle also in a tenta-
tive HVT for individual quantum processes, we have come
to the conclusion that, in agreement with the empirical
evidence that past, present and future are basically dif-
ferent, the validity of the notion of CFD breaks down
at the HV level. In physical terms this means that HV
states λ(xµ) may have the property of being “nonrepro-
ducible”. In other words, one may envisage the situation
that the HVT’s initial conditions can no longer be repro-
duced, so that it no longer has sense to ask for a single
event the counterfactual question “what would have hap-
pened if, instead of the actual choice, another choice had
been made”.
We have argued that (formal) determinism and causal-
ity may still be valid in a HVT, just like in CM and in
QM. Furthermore, specifying to correlated observations,
the notions cause and effect apply between the prepara-
tion and the correlated measurements, but not between
the correlated measurements themselves, the time se-
quence depending on the frame of reference. The ex-
istence of a correlation may be explained simply on the
ground that there is a common past.
We conclude further that our NRH is compatible
with the empirical existence of an arrow of time, and
agrees with statements such as one of Y. Aharonov,
P.G. Bergmann, J.L. Lebowitz:[49] “One of the perenially
challenging problems of theoretical physics is that of the
‘arrow of time.’ Everyday experience teaches us that the
future is qualitatively different from the past, that our
practical powers of prediction differ vastly from those of
memory, and that complex physical systems tend to de-
velop in the course of time in patterns distinct from those
of their antecedents.”
Finally, in our approach we have got a reconciliation
between Einstein’s and Bohr’s views. EPR’s suggestion
that QM may be completed by a more detailed local HVT
is shown to be possible. In such a theory, EPR’s “ele-
ments of physical reality” should correspond with time–
dependent, but nonreproducible, initial conditions in the
HVT. In this way EPR’s conclusion of the simultane-
ous existence of quantummechanical incompatible ob-
servables can be avoided. This solution roughly corre-
sponds with EPR’s last paragraph, in which they offer
a similar way out of their contradictory conclusion of
the simultaneous existence of quantummechanically in-
compatible elements of reality. Because the evolution of
physical processes may proceed according to determinis-
tic laws, Einstein’s dictum that “God does not play dice”
is met.
If physics is defined as being concerned, as Bohr would
have it, with observable, reproducible, phenomena then a
HVT, which would describe the dynamics of λ(xµ), would
be, at least at present, of no practical use because of the
basic failure to know exactly the initial conditions. In
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that case it will be difficult – if not impossible for human
beings – to surpass QM, which then may be considered a
complete “FAPP”[53] theory because it answers all pos-
sible questions which may ever be posed by human ob-
servers. In this case it is not God himself who plays dice,
but rather the human observer because of his intrinsic
limitations.
Hence, from a fundamental point of view EPR are
right. However, those prefering a more pragmatic point
of view, may join Bohr in that it may turn out impossible,
because of the observer’s limitations, to describe causally
and quantitatively individual quantum processes. Yet,
surprises may never be excluded, and in a near future
one may get more control over an objectively existing re-
ality, such as brought about by the Renninger thought
experiment.
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